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Sue Donaldson’s and Will Kymlicka’s Zoopolis: a Political Theory of Ani-
mal Rights is a very laudable effort to move the animal rights discussion 
beyond the issue of animal individuals’ basic moral status. The authors 
consider the question of our overall obligations towards the class of ani-
mals that can plausibly be viewed as our co-citizens; towards the class that 
may be considered “liminal”; and last but not least, the class of wilderness 
animals in nature, whose communities should enjoy prima facie sovereignty 
rights  – as a way of preventing and correcting for impermissible human 
action towards them. The latter also raises the question of humanitarian 
intervention in nature, which is potentially very consequential and should 
therefore be accorded significant epistemic resources: Could natural animal 
populations be (akin to) failed states? And if so, what is the prevalence of 
failed states in nature? Donaldson and Kymlicka seem to admit the nor-
mative possibility of humanitarian intervention in nature but deny obliga-
tions to try and intervene on a large, systematic scale, mainly on empirical 
grounds.
In what follows, I will outline the crucial questions, normative and 
empirical, which the issue of humanitarian intervention in nature hinges on. 
Crucial questions are questions which, depending on how we answer them, 
can radically alter the practical course we take  1. If we get a crucial question 
wrong, our actions are likely to be radically sub-optimal or even counter-
productive. In addition to outlining the crucial questions for humanitarian 
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intervention in nature, I will attempt to identify their probable answers on 
the basis of arguments that are likely to have dominant force. I will argue 
that Donaldson and Kymlicka are right about the normative possibility of 
humanitarian intervention in nature but empirically probably wrong about 
the non-existence of an obligation to try and help wilderness animals on a 
large, systematic scale. 
The proposed crucial questions are: (1) What is the empirical fact of 
the matter about how good/bad the situation of wilderness populations is? 
Are they “competent” or rather “failed states”? (2) If we were to try and 
intervene in nature, what is the probability of us actually (greatly) improv-
ing the situation vs. making it (much) worse? (3) To what extent should we 
accept obligations to help? Or: How (non-)consequentialist should we be?
Crucial question (1): What is the empirical fact of the matter about how 
good/bad the situation of wilderness populations is? Are they “competent” or 
rather “failed states”?
This question is crucial because there is broad agreement that the 
situation of wilderness populations being (sufficiently) catastrophic greatly 
increases the probability that an obligation to systematic humanitarian 
intervention exists. Donaldson and Kymlicka accept “overwhelming catas-
trophes” (e.g. by meteor impacts or devastating viruses) as a “triggers for 
intervention” (p. 182) and are sympathetic to the view that “there are times 
when humans should insert themselves into the equation, altering nature’s 
course in order to prevent catastrophe” (p. 290) and thus oppose the “let 
nature be” doctrine. 
When we think of wilderness animals, we tend to imagine cases of ani-
mals that may have decently autonomous, long and happy lives. These are 
strongly “K-selected” animals (MacArthur and Wilson 1967; Pianka 1970), 
i.e. species with few offspring that are taken good care of. Unfortunately, 
K-selected species do not seem to be representative of the animal popula-
tions in nature: species following the “r-selection” strategy are much more 
prevalent (Ng 1995; Horta 2010a). They bet on the numbers and have many 
more offspring than will survive to adulthood. If populations remain roughly 
stable (as they eventually must, given finite resources), then only one child 
can survive per parent individual – but r-selected animals have hundreds, 
thousands or even millions of offspring during their life-time. The conse-
quence is that almost all of them have lives that can roughly be characterized 
as follows: birth; struggle over the way too scarce resources against the way 
too numerous siblings; gruesome death very shortly after birth. In his paper, 
Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Bad Marriage, Quick Divorce, 
Mark Sagoff quotes the following passage from Fred Hapgood: 
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All species reproduce in excess, way past the carrying capacity of their niche. 
In her lifetime a lioness might have 20 cubs; a pigeon, 150 chicks; a mouse, 
1000 kits; a trout, 20,000 fry, a tuna or cod, a million fry or more; […] and an 
oyster, perhaps a hundred million spat. If one assumes that the population of 
each of these species is, from generation to generation, roughly equal, then on 
average only one offspring will survive to replace each parent. All the other 
thousands and millions will die, one way or another. (Hapgood 1979, 44-5)
Sagoff continues: 
The misery of animals in nature–which humans can do much to relieve–
makes every other form of suffering pale in comparison. Mother Nature is 
so cruel to her children she makes Frank Perdue look like a saint. (Sagoff 
1984, 297)
In Zoopolis, Donaldson and Kymlicka do consider the harms wilderness 
animals suffer in some detail. They mainly focus on food cycles and pre-
dation and claim that the evidence suggests that wilderness communities 
“respond competently [to this challenge]” (pp. 176, 288). While this may 
or may not be true, the much bigger – much more crucial – empirical issue 
is the one of wasteful reproductive strategies, which seem to be by far 
the biggest cause of suffering, preference frustration and death in nature 
(Tomasik 2009a; Horta 2010a). They should therefore be prioritized in our 
analysis. Unfortunately, Donaldson and Kymlicka only consider them in 
one very brief passage:
This competence argument [to the conclusion that wilderness populations 
are sufficiently competent to self-govern, which is a necessary condition 
of their sovereignty rights] is more compelling in relation to some animals 
than to others. Many mammalian species produce few offspring, and invest 
greatly in their care either as individual parents or larger social groups. Indi-
vidual young have a real chance of surviving the challenges of their early 
years and making it to adulthood. Compare this with the many amphibian 
and reptile species who lay vast quantities of eggs and leave them to fend for 
themselves. Most eggs never hatch. Most hatchlings are quickly consumed 
by predators. Life for many a fish, turtle, or lizard amounts to a few brief 
moments after emerging from the shell until a larger fish or bird or reptile 
swoops in to devour them. The scope for “competent agency” varies across 
species, but should be recognised and supported wherever it does exist. For 
some species, it grounds a strong argument for respecting autonomy. For 
others, the argument is weaker. On balance, however, we should still respect 
the sovereignty of wild animals, including those for whom there is minimal 
evidence of competent agency, because the argument is strongly buttressed 
by the earlier arguments about fallibility and flourishing. (p. 176)
Before turning to the fallibility argument under crucial question (2), let me 
note how this passage is dubious in the light of the empirical facts: it is not 
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clear whether individual young have a “real chance” of making it to adult-
hood even for the most strongly K-selected species. A lioness might have 
20 cubs, only two of which will reach successful sexual maturity on aver-
age. These are bad odds, and they are good compared with the typical odds 
in nature, which are terrible – and which permanently affect hundreds of 
billions of animals (Tomasik 2009b). Given this situation, it is unclear why 
“competence” (and resulting sovereignty) should be the default assump-
tion. Rather, the empirical evidence probably supports an “incompetence” 
default assumption. Donaldson and Kymlicka accept that there are wilder-
ness populations for whom there is only “minimal evidence” of competent 
agency, and seem to suggest that by positing sovereignty we are on the safe 
side. But this judgment likely results from a persisting bias towards the “let 
them be” or “let nature be” doctrine, which Zoopolis is itself interested in 
avoiding (p. 285): if the evidence supporting the “competence” assumption 
is minimal, then there is a significant probability that the “incompetence” 
assumption is true, too. On the “incompetence” assumption, positing 
sovereignty and an obligation to non-intervention could be a momentous 
moral error. It is thus not true that a “safe side” consideration points 
towards non-intervention. Rather, the empirical facts about what life in 
nature is typically and permanently like for hundreds of billions of animals 
make the opposite view more probable. (Crucial questions [2] and [3] will 
further elaborate on “safe side” considerations.) 
Crucial question (1) is meant to be about empirical facts. One might 
legitimately wonder whether the normative question of population ethics 
should not be listed as a separate crucial question: Which (sub-)popula-
tions are optimal/good/neutral/bad/catastrophic? Is some total or average 
value the (more) relevant criterion? Can the extreme suffering of some 
members of a population be outweighed by the happiness of sufficiently 
many others? Given that population ethics confronts us with very difficult 
problems whose solutions are highly controversial (Arrhenius 2000), listing 
it as a separate crucial question seems particularly in order. I have decided 
against doing so for the purposes at hand, though, based on the follow-
ing consideration: Donaldson and Kymlicka share the broad agreement 
that an obligation to (large-scale, systematic) humanitarian intervention 
necessitates the existence of a (large-scale, systematic) catastrophe, i.e. an 
axiologically catastrophic animal (sub-)population in nature. The question 
of when a population is catastrophic is thus of particular interest to us. 
Now, the class of judgments that are highly controversial in population 
ethics is wide-ranging, but some judgments about what very bad popula-
tions look like do not belong to it. It is uncontroversial that populations 
where almost 100% of an enormous number of individuals die very painful 
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deaths very shortly after birth are catastrophic. The section at hand – on 
crucial question (1) – has argued that the hypothesis that many wilderness 
(sub-)populations are in fact catastrophic is reasonably probable, or at the 
very least much less improbable than is standardly assumed. If this case 
is sound, then Donaldson and Kymlicka should be much more willing to 
assume the existence of “failed states” in nature triggering obligations to 
humanitarian intervention. In the context of their discussion of the “com-
petence” assumption, they write: 
Someone might respond that wild animals are hardly competent to exercise 
sovereignty if they are unable to protect all of their own members from star-
vation or predation. If a human community failed in this regard, we would 
likely view it as a “failed state”, or in any event one that requires some degree 
of external intervention. But in the context of ecosystems, food cycles and 
predator-prey relationships are not indicators of “failure”. Rather, they are 
defining features of the context within which wild animal communities 
exist; they frame the challenges to which wild animals must respond both 
individually and collectively, and the evidence suggests that they respond 
competently. (p. 176)
The footnote to the passage elaborates: 
Wild animals could turn the tables here, pointing to the sustainability of 
sovereign animal communities compared with the rapacious ecological foot-
print of human communities which is quite possibly leading us all towards 
ecological collapse. (p. 288)
Sustainability being positive and greatly important assumes that popula-
tions in nature are not just non-catastrophic, but (greatly) net positive. The 
empirical evidence about reproductive strategies calls this into question. 
If an enormous human population were permanently stuck in a situ-
ation where almost all its members died very painful deaths very shortly 
after birth, judging it a tragically failed state would not be controversial. 
Moreover, we would (rightly) refrain from definitionally sanctifying the 
causes of the countless, painful deaths as “not indicators of failure” and 
“defining features of the context within which the communities exist”, as 
well as from (even partly) defining “flourishing” in terms of what happens 
to humans in horrific contexts, however normal they may be. If the very 
defining features of a context cause catastrophe, then so much the worse 
for the context. These features belonging to the “natural” context does not 
diminish the harm that results for the sentient individuals affected by them, 
as Donaldson and Kymlicka seem to agree (p. 32).
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Crucial question (2): If we were to try and intervene in nature, what is the 
probability of us actually (greatly) improving the situation vs. making it 
(much) worse?
This question is crucial because if a pessimistic stance on our ability to 
positively intervene on a large-scale is correct, there can be no obligation 
to intervene even if the situation of wilderness animals were indefinitely 
catastrophic. 
The fallibility argument (p. 163) says that we are prone to serious 
misjudgements about when and how to intervene for the better (especially 
when intervening on a large, systematic scale), which our track record 
bears out. Therefore, were we to embark on a “large-scale humanitarian 
intervention in nature” project, we would be likely to make the situation 
(possibly catastrophically) worse.
It is, of course, very reasonable to be concerned with our epistemic 
limitations and practical track records. However, the fallibility argument as 
outlined above is open to a number of serious objections: first, the project 
would be one of altruistically motivated intervention in nature. No bad 
track record exists in this regard. And it is hard to see how (advocacy for) 
such a project, especially when combined with (advocacy for) very careful, 
gradual, scientifically grounded procedure – so as to safeguard global stabil-
ity and enable adequately informed decisions –, would be more likely to 
lead to bad rather than good outcomes. Second, even if the risk of (greatly) 
net negative outcomes were very significant, it is to be balanced against 
the risk – or rather, assuming what has been said on crucial question (1), 
the certain, indefinitely ongoing catastrophe – of doing nothing. It is by 
no means clear that the former risk is greater. Cognitive psychology has 
shown that human minds are systematically biased against taking harmful 
omissions into account, and toward the status quo, which is likely to distort 
our assessment of the decisional situation (Spranca et al. 1991). Third, the 
empirical evidence presented as crucial for the task of answering (1) would 
suggest that the risk of doing nothing is greater: in a permanent situation 
where almost 100% of the members of a population die gruesome deaths 
very shortly after birth, it is probably quite hard to make the situation even 
worse, let alone catastrophically worse. The probability of making it cata-
strophically worse, although a popular theme and worry, may be close to 
zero. Indeed – adding to the aforesaid first point – it seems, perversely, pos-
sible that humanity’s track record of primarily egoistically motivated (and 
near-sighted) intervention in nature has been net positive for wilderness 
animals. Humanity’s net effect on nature has been to significantly reduce 
it – in ways that jeopardize global stability, which is an enormously bad 
consequence that responsible humanitarian intervention must avoid. But 
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purely in terms of how well or badly wilderness animals are off, it is not clear 
the situation has gotten worse even through egoistic human intervention: 
it is quite uncontroversial in population ethics that some possible popula-
tions are sufficiently catastrophic to support the judgment that reductions 
in (future) population size are good. (Incidentally, this is just the causal 
effect vegetarianism and veganism have.) Exactly how bad the situation of 
wilderness animals is remains an open research question, but the empirical 
evidence regarding reproductive strategies suggests that we should not be 
surprised to find that it is catastrophic. 
If we were to accept an important obligation to large-scale, system-
atic humanitarian intervention in nature, it would likely translate into an 
urgently set-up massive research project of “welfare biology” (Ng 1995) 
for the time being: many open research questions need to be explored 
and adequately answered first. After a long phase of small-scale trials, 
one might (or might not, depending on the results) ultimately attempt to 
implement larger-scale interventions. They might, e.g., take the form of 
safe and stable reductions of the prevalence of r-selected animals relative 
to K-selected ones, which can probably be expected to improve the fate 
of wilderness populations. Cross-species fertility control is likely to play 
a crucial role (just as systematic fertility control has been crucial for the 
welfare of the human species). In general, we should expect there to be a 
number of positive large-scale interventions that are inconceivable given 
present-day knowledge and technology, but which may become feasible in 
the coming decades and centuries (Bostrom 2014). With our choices today, 
we inevitably influence the probability that technologically advanced future 
decision-makers will try and help wilderness animals in nature - or not.
For an illustration of what significant initial steps might look like, I 
recommend examining existing proposals such as the one for a “welfare 
state for elephants”, providing “cradle-to-the-grave healthcare and wel-
fare provision for the entire population of free-living elephants” (Pearce 
2012). They seem to be in line with Zoopolis’ spirit: in an interview (Man-
nino 2014), Kymlicka has accepted duties to small-scale intervention such 
as protecting “prey animals” from predators on a one-off basis (e.g., by 
making some noise if, while hiking, we see a predator about initiate an 
attack). Kymlicka also accepts larger-scale interventions such as protect-
ing wilderness populations against new and devastating parasites. He does 
fear, though, that if we go beyond the “one-off” basis, we will reach a situ-
ation of human management – a “natural zoo” – that undermines wilder-
ness animals’ right to live autonomously. However, the difference between 
“one-off” and “systematic” intervention is not categorical, but gradual. It 
is not clear when the blurred line between the two is being crossed (if we 
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have a prima facie obligation to protect one “prey animal”, then the same 
obligation presumably applies to the next, and so on); nor is it at all clear 
that systematic human intervention cannot empirically be the much lesser 
evil for wilderness animals in terms of their degree of autonomy. Only we 
can find out. Zoopolis’ argument that wilderness animals are not seeking 
human contact (nor, a fortiori, humanitarian intervention) and are thus 
“voting with their feet” (p. 177) for sovereignty is dubious: wilderness ani-
mals lack the competence to adequately understand the situation they are 
in, let alone to compare it to the potential alternatives and pursue them. 
We may have it – any may thus be obliged to act on their behalf. At this 
point, we should certainly not be confident that the billions of animals that 
are starving to death, being eaten alive, asphyxiated or disembowelled as 
we speak would reject systematic human management in favor of the status 
quo (if they were competent to assess the decisional situation), but rather 
accept a probabilistic pointer in the other direction. 
Crucial question (3): To what extent should we accept obligations to help? 
Or: How (non-)consequentialist should we be?
This question is crucial because any obligation to humanitarian inter-
vention is an obligation to help (equivalent to positive rights of the individu-
als to be helped), which non-consequentialist normative outlooks might 
deny or consider relatively unimportant in the first place. 
Donaldson and Kymlicka note that a narrow focus on our obligations 
not to harm animals (equivalent to their negative rights) has been popular 
in animal rights theory (p. 159). The least controversial argument justify-
ing this focus is the fact that the harms we actively (and directly) cause to 
animals are the ones we can most easily remove. This argument has a lot 
of merit, but it may be just one element of the full picture, given what has 
been said on (1) and (2), and given the options for answering (3). Donald-
son and Kymlicka rightly note: 
The fact that animals have a negative right not to be killed which humans 
must respect does not logically entail that animals also have a positive right 
to human aid or protection in the face of threats […]. But while there is 
no logical contradiction in affirming the former and rejecting the latter, the 
moral rationale for the former seems to push in the direction of the latter, 
and critics of [animal rights theory] are right to say that this moral tension 
has not been adequately addressed. (p. 285)
It is indeed a powerful push. It is logical, too, in the sense that if the driving 
reason (or: one reason) for not harming animals is that it is counterfactually 
bad for them, then it is logically inconsistent to deny the existence of any 
reason to help them – for if we do not help them, it is counterfactually bad 
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for them, too. Justifying obligations not to harm on (at least partly) altru-
ist grounds and rejecting any obligation to help is inconsistent (Norcross 
2008). Furthermore, if obligations not to harm are justified from the impar-
tial perspective (Harsanyi 1953; 1955) or from behind the veil of ignorance 
(Rawls 1971), then strong obligations to help cannot be avoided either: 
positing them will make us much better off than rejecting them. Further 
arguments for accepting obligations to help animals are from intuition and 
parallel human cases: Peter Singer’s famous Drowning Child Argument 
(make it a Drowning Piglet Argument) is very hard to completely reject 
(Singer 1972), and most legislations accept obligations to direct aid (“duty 
to rescue”) as well as more indirect obligations to help other members of 
local and global society. More specifically, the view is widely shared that 
obligations to humanitarian intervention can be triggered by catastrophes 
of all sorts. Additionally, there is a “safe side” consideration in favour of 
granting obligations to help significant moral weight: even if one remains 
sceptical about the aforesaid arguments for obligations to help, one should 
grant a non-trivial probability of being wrong about the matter, especially 
in the light of strong peer disagreement. It follows that while providing 
help is certainly no moral error (but may be supererogatory), not providing 
help could – with the granted probability – be a serious moral error. We 
should therefore seek to err on the safe side and lean towards accepting 
obligations to help.
One might object that while it is plausible to grant some obligations 
to help, they should count for much less than our obligations not harm; 
and that, empirically, we will not be able to help wilderness animals on a 
large scale without harming some of them in the process. The latter is true, 
but consider the parallel human cases: very few normative outlooks reject 
humanitarian intervention in all practical cases – and practical humanitar-
ian intervention usually comes with the risk (and reality/necessity) of seri-
ously harming some individuals. Furthermore, the greater the catastrophe 
to be prevented, the more acceptable is harming some individuals in the 
process. More specifically, imagine what the typical moral reactions would 
be if almost 100% of the individuals of an enormous human population 
were suffering permanently horrible fates. There is no question that inter-
ventionist research programs would urgently be set up – and that in the 
face of the enormous catastrophe, a significant amount of actively (though 
unintentionally and regretfully) caused damage would be accepted. 
In Zoopolis, Donaldson and Kymlicka discuss a number of novel issues 
that arise in the context of extending animal ethics beyond animals’ basic 
moral status. Humanitarian intervention in nature is one such issue. It is 
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potentially very consequential and thus needs to be accorded significant 
epistemic resources. I have attempted to outline the crucial questions upon 
which the issue of large-scale humanitarian intervention in nature turns. 
Crucial question (1) asks how good/bad the situation of wilderness animals 
actually is, as a matter of empirical fact. Humanitarian intervention presup-
poses the existence of a catastrophe and there is broad population-ethical 
agreement on what this means. I have argued that we currently tend to 
greatly underestimate the probability of wilderness animals’ situation being 
permanently catastrophic. Crucial question (2) asks to what extent we can 
be confident that our intervention would actually make things (much) bet-
ter, as opposed to (catastrophically) worse. I have argued that we have no 
track record of altruistically motivated intervention in nature going badly 
and can expect it to go reasonably well; that we need to balance the risks of 
intervening against the risks of doing nothing, which we are biased against; 
and that if and to the extent that the situation of wilderness animals already 
is permanently and indefinitely catastrophic, it is hard to make it worse 
(even through egoistic intervention), let alone catastrophically so, and easy 
to make it better. Question (2) thus partly hinges on question (1). Crucial 
question (3) asks to what extent we should accept obligations to help, i.e. 
be consequentialist. I have argued that theoretical arguments, arguments 
from intuition and parallel human cases, as well as a “safe side” considera-
tion speak in favour of accepting significant obligations to help; further-
more, that the greater the catastrophe to be prevented, the harder it is to 
deny any practical obligation to try and help, and to deny the acceptability 
of some harm actively caused in the process.
The Zoopolis authors’ judgment seems to broadly coincide with my 
own on the normative questions contained in (2) and (3). There is signifi-
cant disagreement on the crucial empirical question of (1) as well as on the 
empirical aspect of (2), which thus recommend themselves as productive 
focal points of further research and discussion. Such discussion could 
likely benefit from a greater willingness to view supposed “reductios” as 
counterintuitive discoveries, not only but especially by authors critical of 
anthropocentrism. Cognitive psychology suggests that our intuitions are 
affected by numerous biases, e.g., “status quo bias” (Bostrom and Ord 
2006). Non-anthropocentrism – in the form of non-speciesism (Faria and 
Paez 2014) – is both well-supported (Horta 2010b) and counterintuitive: 
it greatly alters our ethico-political outlook and overturns traditional pri-
orities. Additional counterintuitive discoveries further down the inferential 
line should not come as a big surprise: They are predicted by the fact that 
(non-)anthropocentrism occupies a very crucial place in our action-guiding 
belief system.
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